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ABSTRACT 
 
Despite the increasing attention to ethical investments, the empirical studies on Islamic indices 
are scarce. The main goal of this article is to investigate whether Dow Jones Islamic Index 100 
Titans (DJI100) delivers persistent performance. Using the Carhart (1997) four-factor model, we 
consider all historical data available from the launching of the index by Dow Jones on September 
1999 to March 2011. We study all the firms included in the index and we construct the risk factors 
(Market premium, size, Book-to-Market, momentum). Our findings show positive performance for 
momentum strategy and support the idea that ethical investments could under-perform and thus 
investors accept to pay for their ethics. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
inancial literature distinguishes between the return of past winners and past losers. Actually, we 
should observe either performance persistence or performance reversal. If past losers (winners) 
become future winners (losers), this situation could be described as an overreaction toward new 
information (De Bondt & Thaler, 1985). Otherwise, if past winners continue to over perform past losers, the 
performance is deemed to be persistent (Jegadeesh & Titman, 1993). 
 
In order to assess the performance of managed portfolios by predicting risks and returns, various models 
exist. The CAPM of Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965) suggests to compare return and risk with market portfolio. 
The Fama and French (1993) three-factor Model was suggested to capture much of the variation of average return. 
This model is based on three factors: The first one is the market excess return or the market premium (Rm-Rf). The 
second factor is the size premium which measures the difference between the return of small capitalizations and big 
capitalizations (Small minus Big or SMB). The third factor is the book-to-market premium computed by taking the 
difference between the return of value and growth portfolios (High minus Low or HML). The Carhart (1997) model 
extends the Fama and French (1993) model by adding to it an effect documented by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). 
The added factor is momentum which measures difference between past winners and past losers and thus the 
persistence of performance (Up minus Down or UMD). 
 
Ethical investment performance is well documented in the finance literature, but neither its over 
performance nor its underperformance could win the searcher’s unanimous support. Our article contributes to 
current debates; we try to provide additional evidence from Islamic indices as a part of faith-based or morally-
responsible investment. Thus, we investigate whether Dow Jones Islamic Index 100 Titans (DJI100) delivers 
persistent performance, we use Carhart (1997) four-factor pricing model. We construct factors using both Fama and 
French (1993) and Carhart (1997) methodologies. We assess the persistence performance of the Islamic Index, by 
applying the four-factor pricing model to the firms included in DJI100. Next, we extend the study to highlight the 
turn-of-the-year effect (January effect) since the previous works find seasonality in momentum profits. Finally we 
F 
The Journal of Applied Business Research – May/June 2014 Volume 30, Number 3 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 918 The Clute Institute 
study the index persistence of performance over the business cycle, by distinguishing recession and expansion 
periods. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we introduce briefly the basic framework 
of the Islamic finance industry and Islamic indices’ universe. In Section 3 we present our data and methodology. 
Section 4 discusses the empirical results and Section 5 concludes the article. 
 
2. PRESENTATION OF ISLAMIC FINANCE AND INDICES 
 
Islamic finance is based on a set of principles referred to as Shariah (Islamic Law). The 5 principles are the 
following: 
 
 The profit and loss sharing 
 The prohibition of interest 
 The asset-backing 
 The prohibition of excessive uncertainty 
 The prohibition of some sectors (alcohol, pork-related products, conventional banks and insurance, 
gambling…) 
 
Another principle is zakat which is a form of charity paid on personal wealth which exceed the “Nisab” and 
held for one complete year. The rate of zakat on most forms of monetary wealth and earned income is 2.5%. For 
Islamic financial institutions and mutual funds, the calculation is usually performed by supervisory Shariah board. 
 
By applying these principles, the Islamic financial system was established to take into consideration - 
besides religious aspects - moral, ethical, and social dimensions. In recent years, Islamic banking and finance has 
been recognized as a rapidly-growing part of the financial sector (Čihák & Hesse, 2010). This was a result of the 
increasing attention to Islamic investments driven by the recent innovations in Islamic finance. The later covers for 
example the banking system, the mutual funds industry, derivatives, stock market, insurance, and reinsurance 
industry. 
 
Another aspect of this innovation was the Shariah compliant indices which are equity benchmark indices 
designed to track the performance of publicly traded Shariah-compliant companies. Indeed, Islamic indices are 
considered as part of morally-responsible investments (Ghoul & Karam, 2007) and their principle is similar to that 
of social indices in terms of screening (Novethic, 2009), both of them have supervisory boards which provide advice 
on eligibility of companies, but the main difference between them is that the referent is religious for Islamic indices 
and compliance is guaranteed by Shariah boards. 
 
Chronologically, Islamic indices were launched for the first time in the late nineties, the beginning was on 
April 1998 with the index DMI 150 (Dar al Mal al-Islami) launched jointly by two private banks (Faisal Finance and 
Bank Vontobel) in order to measure the performance of the 150 largest global publicly traded companies. Another 
index was created on November of the same year; it was SAMI (Socially Aware Muslim Index) which measured the 
performance of 500 Shariah compliant companies. 
 
After this beginning, several financial markets had launched their own Islamic indices as a new alternative 
for the investors seeking for investment opportunities without compromising their beliefs. That way Dow Jones 
created the Dow Jones Islamic Market Index (DJIMI) on February 1999 and FTSE Group launched Global Islamic 
Index Series (GIIS) at London Stock Exchange on October 1999. The index provider, Standard and Poor’s, created 
the Global Benchmark Shariah indices on December 2006 and MSCI Barra launched its global family of Islamic 
indices on March 2007. On February 2011, Stoxx limited introduced the first set of Shariah compliant indices for 
Europe and Euro zone; these indices measure the performance of Shariah compliant companies selected from the 
universe of Stoxx Europe 600 index (see Appendix 1 for more details). 
 
In addition to the previous indices which had an internationally geographical coverage, some financial 
places had introduced their own Islamic indices with a local focus; that’s the case for the stock exchanges of 
Malaysia, India, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Taiwan, Bahrain, Turkey, Egypt, etc. 
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All Islamic indices have a common feature, which is the selection process, they use screening as a prevalent 
method for selecting their constituents. The benchmarks from which Islamic indices are selected are well-recognized 
conventional indices. The independent Shariah boards carry out the screening process regarding the activity sector 
of firms and their financial ratios (Appendix 2). 
 
2.1 Previous Works 
 
The persistence of the performance of the US stock market has received a high level of academic scrutiny, 
the majority of research focused on the American mutual funds (Carhart, 1997). Nevertheless, the persistence of 
performance using the four-factor models has been studied for the Canadian stock market (L’Her et al., 2004), the 
Australian market (Humphrey & O’Brien, 2010), the British market (Ferruz et al., 2010), and Lilty and Gouzerh 
(2007) who scrutinized the performance persistence of an international portfolio. 
 
The purpose of these studies is to determine whether the selection of assets with ethical screening could 
lead to over performance. According to Schröder (2007) and Bauer et al. (2007), searchers in general observe no 
evidence of significant differences in risk-adjusted returns between ethical and conventional investments. This 
conclusion is confirmed recently by Le Sourd (2011) which finds that the majority of differences are not significant 
and the only few significant alpha values are negatives (underperformance) even if the study used a constructed 
efficient ethical index. 
 
Early studies on Islamic financial markets discussed the feasibility of an Islamic stock market (Elgari, 
1993) and its particularities in terms of practices and regulation (Alhabshi, 1994). Whereas Islamic mutual funds 
have been the subject of many academic researches (Annuar et al., 1997; Ismail et Shakrani, 2003; Elfakhani et al., 
2005; Abdullah et al., 2007; Saad et al., 2010), Islamic indices have not received the same level of scrutiny. This 
situation can be explained by the short histories of Islamic indices and by some methodological difficulties due to 
differences in size and industry-weighting which complicated performance comparisons against benchmark indices 
(Fowler & Hope, 2007). 
 
However, Schröder (2007) argues that the study of indices has advantages since various issues don’t have 
to be considered. Thus by analyzing the performance of indices the searcher avoids methodological problems related 
to transaction costs, the timing activities, the skill of the fund management, and the changes in investment policy. 
 
To the best of our knowledge, the persistence of the performance of Islamic indices using the four factor 
model was studied only in three papers (Girard & Hassan, 2005, 2008; Abul Hassan et al., 2005). Girard and Hassan 
(2005) find that there is no significant difference between Islamic and conventional indices. Their sample of Dow 
Jones Islamic indices outperform the conventional counterparts from January 1996
1
 to November 2000 and 
underperform from December 2000 to November 2005. Indeed, after controlling for market risk, size, book-to-
market, and momentum, the difference in return between Islamic and conventional returns remain negligible (no 
significant alpha). 
 
The authors confirm these findings in their subsequent study (Girard & Hassan, 2008) in which they 
analyzed the FTSE Shariah index from January 1999 to December 2006 and they found no convincing performance 
differences. By studying the size, book-to-market, and momentum effects, they found that Islamic indices are 
growth and small-cap oriented and conventional indices are relatively more value and mid-cap focused. Applying 
the same four-factor model, Abul Hassan et al. (2005) used the monthly data of Dow Jones indices from January 
1996 to December 2003; their findings indicate that the Islamic ethical screens do not necessarily have an adverse 
impact on investment performance. 
 
There are two main differences between these three previous works and our current study. First, the 
exclusion of non-ethical stocks (sin stocks) from Islamic indices leads to exclude “recession-proof” stocks (Hong & 
Kacperczyk, 2009). For this reason, we study the persistence of performance over the business cycle by suggesting a 
                                                          
1 The authors used back-tested data, since the studied Islamic indices have been introduced on February 1999, but data are available back to 
December 31, 1995. 
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model in which we distinguish between expansion and recession periods. Second, we study the seasonality of the 
momentum profits for the 100 firms included in the Dow Jones Islamic Index Titans 100. 
 
3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Data 
 
Our study covers the period from September 1999 to March 2011 and the required monthly data were 
retrieved either from Datastream or Factset databases. With regard to Islamic indices, we consider the Dow Jones 
Islamic Index Titans 100 (DJI100), the benchmark is a conventional large index from the Dow Jones family: Dow 
Jones Global World Index (W1DOW). 
 
Factset database is used in order to collect data on accounting figures of firms included in the Dow Jones 
Islamic Index. Thus we construct portfolios based on the size (SMB), the book-to-market (HML), and the 
momentum (UMD). The methodology of construction of these factors is described below. As a proxy for the risk-
free rate we use the US Treasury Bill (3 month), data are available in Factset database. Also we choose not to 
include back-tested data, since even if data are available back to December 31, 1995, the Dow Jones Islamic Index 
Titans 100 hasn’t been really launched until September 1999. 
 
3.2 Methodology 
 
By using the four-factor pricing model, we suggest to study the performance persistence of firms 
composing the Dow Jones Islamic Market Titans 100 Index. 
 
The model can be written as: 
 
ttuthtsftmtftt εUMDβHMLβSMBβRRβαRR ++++)-(+=)-(  (1) 
 
Where: 
 
 )-( ftmt RR is the market return in excess of the risk-free rate, or the market premium. 
 SMB  (Small Minus Big) or the size factor is computed by taking the difference between the return of 
small capitalization (S) and big capitalization (B) portfolios. 
 HML  (High Minus Low) or the value factor is computed by taking the difference between the return of 
High book-to-market (H) and the Low book-to-market (L) portfolios. 
 UMD (Up Minus Down) or the momentum factor is computed each month by taking the difference 
between past winners (U) and past losers (D) over 12-month-return. 
 
The factors SMB, HML, and UMD are estimated according to the methodology suggested by Fama and 
French (1993) and L’Her et al. (2004). SMB and HML are calculated annually with combinations of equally 
weighted portfolios composed by ranked stocks in ascending order of size and book to market. The momentum 
factor (UMD) is calculated monthly with intersection of two portfolios formed on size and three portfolios formed 
on prior return. In line with Carhart (1997), we equally weighted firm returns to form the portfolios and we consider 
the formation period from month -12 to month -1 and holding period from month 1 to month 12. 
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For the three factors, the used breakpoints are the following: 
 
Table 1: The Breakpoints used for the Constitution of Portfolios 
Size 
50% S 
(5 top deciles: lower than the median) 
50% B 
(5 bottom deciles: higher than the median) 
Book to Market 
30% H 
(3 bottom deciles) 
40% M 
(4 medium deciles) 
30% L 
(3 top deciles) 
Momentum 
30% U 
(3 bottom deciles) 
- 
30% D 
(3 top deciles) 
 
With this combination we obtain the following portfolios: 
 
Table 2: The Combination of Size, Book-to-Market and Momentum Effect 
 High B/M Median B/M Low B/M Winners (Up) Losers (Down) 
Big caps BH (annually) BM (annually) BL(annually) BU (monthly) BD (monthly) 
Small caps SH (annually) SM (annually) SL(annually) SU (monthly) SD (monthly) 
 
Then, the 3 factors are calculated as follows: 
 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
3
-+-+-
=
BHSHBMSMBLSL
SMB  
 
( ) ( )
2
-+-
=
SLBLSHBH
HML  
 
( ) ( )
2
-+-
=
BDBUSDSU
UMD  
 
After calculating the factors, we will compare SMB and HML with those found by Fama and French 
(1996) for the US market in terms of return and risk, and the momentum factor (UMD) will be compared with that 
of Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) as calculated and annualized by L’Her et al. (2004). 
 
We also investigate momentum seasonality documented by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) and confirmed in 
a subsequent research (Jegadeesh & Titman, 2001) considering that the winners outperform losers in all months 
except January where losers outperform the winners. In addition, we study the sensitivity of the stocks composing 
the Dow Jones Islamic Market Titans100 Index to the economic conditions; it comes to analyze their performance 
over the business cycle. For that, we use the methodology of Salaber (2012) by applying the Carhart model with a 
dummy variable which accounts for recession. The periods of expansion and recession correspond to those defined 
by The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). 
 
Let D’ denote the dummy variable, which equals 1 in a recession period and 0 otherwise. Thus, the four-
factor model becomes: 
 
tuthtsftmtftt UMDβHMLβSMBβRRβαRR +++)-(+=)-(     
ttuthtsftmt εUMDDβHMLDβSMBDβRRDβDα +'+'+''+)-(''+''+  (2) 
 
Then we estimate the parameters of this equation in autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity or ARCH 
framework as introduced by Engle (1982); this process allows the conditional variance 
2
tσ  to change over time as a 
function of past errors leaving the unconditional variance constant. 
 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
Firstly, we present summary statistics of the four factors and correlation between them. Then we present 
the results of the regressions on these factors and the behaviour over the business cycle. 
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Table 3: Summary Statistics and Correlations between the Four Factors 
Rf stands for the risk-free rate (US T-bill), SMB is the size factor, HML is the book-to market factor calculated each year, UMD 
is the momentum factor calculated monthly for the firms included in the Dow Jones Islamic Index titans 100. Data are based on 
monthly returns from September 1999 to March 2011 (N = 139). * Indicates significance at 1% level 
(3.1) Summary Statistics 
 RM_RF SMB HML UMD 
Mean -0.022141 0.006234 0.002100 0.045637* 
Std. Dev. 0.058494 0.037416 0.052662 0.054691 
t-mean -1.288260 0.567117 0.135733 2.839975 
(3.2) Correlations 
 RM_RF SMB HML UMD 
RM_RF 1    
SMB 0.090318 1   
HML 0.153757 -0.038897 1  
UMD -0.059848 0.067898 -0.121794 1 
 
Over the September 1999 - March 2011 period, the summary statistics on the four factors presented on 
Table 3 (3.1) show that the average market premium is lower than the other factor’s premiums and the UMD 
portfolio has the highest premiums. This means that momentum strategy has positive performance over the 
September 1999 - March 2011 period. Also SMB premium is positive, meaning that small stocks have performed 
better than big ones, the difference of 0.62% per month (7.44% per year) is higher but less significant than 4.92% 
reported by Fama and French (1996). Value stocks have higher returns than growth ones, the difference of 0.21% 
per month (2.52% per year) is lower and less significant than 6.33% reported by Fama and French (1996). When we 
compare the average standard deviation, we find that the volatility of SMB premium (3.74% per month or 12.96% 
per year) is much lower than the market premium (20.23%) and the 15.44% reported by Fama and French (1996). 
However HML premium with a standard deviation of 5.26% per month (18.24% per year) is more risky than that of 
Fama and French (13.11%) as calculated and annualized by L’Her et al. (2004). 
 
We also note that the correlations between the four factors are very low as shown in Table 3 (3.2). This is 
not a surprising result since it remains consistent with the way we construct the four factors. Indeed, we use the dual 
sort procedure which neutralizes the size effect when we have calculated book-to-market factor and the momentum 
factor each month for the firms included in the DJI100 index as we described in the methodology. This low cross-
correlation between the four factors was revealed by Carhart (1997) and confirmed by other searchers, notably by 
L’Her et al. (2004). 
 
In order to highlight the seasonality in returns, we present the summary statistics of the four factors on 
monthly basis: 
 
Table 4: The Mean and the Standard Deviation of the Four Factor Returns per Month 
This table presents the Mean and the standard deviation of the returns of four-factors of Carhart model from September 1999 to 
March 2011 (N = 139). Rm-Rf  stands for the market premium, SMB is the size factor, HML is the Book-to-Market factor, UMD 
is the momentum factor. SEM is the Standard Error of the Mean calculated by dividing standard deviation by the square root of 
the sample size (N). * Indicates significance at 1% level 
 
Mean Standard Deviation SEM 
 
Rm-Rf SMB HML UMD Rm-Rf SMB HML UMD Rm-Rf SMB HML UMD 
January -0.0427* 0.0112 -0.0185 0.0252 0.1535 0.0803 0.1223 0.2361 0.0130 0.0068 0.0104 0.0200 
February -0.0382* -0.0029 0.0107 0.0397 0.1916 0.1851 0.2730 0.3099 0.0163 0.0157 0.0232 0.0263 
March -0.0046 0.0032 0.0160 0.0269* 0.2251 0.0902 0.1471 0.1066 0.0191 0.0077 0.0125 0.0090 
April -0.0002 -0.0042 0.0012 0.0297* 0.1926 0.1127 0.2581 0.1489 0.0163 0.0096 0.0219 0.0126 
May -0.0204 0.0112 0.0174 0.0171 0.2697 0.2164 0.2309 0.2939 0.0229 0.0184 0.0196 0.0249 
June -0.0410* 0.0147 -0.0234 0.0651* 0.1940 0.1346 0.1916 0.2732 0.0165 0.0114 0.0162 0.0232 
July -0.0292 0.0232 0.0000 0.0581* 0.2415 0.2166 0.1744 0.1273 0.0205 0.0184 0.0148 0.0108 
August -0.0178 0.0159 0.0138 0.0500* 0.8661 0.1517 0.1255 0.1271 0.0735 0.0129 0.0106 0.0108 
September -0.0392 0.0044 -0.0060 0.0595* 0.2829 0.0866 0.1795 0.1542 0.0240 0.0073 0.0152 0.0131 
October -0.0242 -0.0127 0.0043 0.0614 0.2475 0.1223 0.1627 0.1882 0.0210 0.0104 0.0138 0.0160 
November -0.0177 0.0166 -0.0111 0.0535* 0.2281 0.1391 0.1326 0.1041 0.0193 0.0118 0.0112 0.0088 
December 0.0080 -0.0051 0.0310* 0.0610* 0.2039 0.1126 0.1588 0.1447 0.0173 0.0095 0.0135 0.0123 
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Table 4 shows results in line with Jegadeesh and Titman (2001), we find that the winners outperform losers 
in all month as momentum factor is positive. However, the difference is significant only for 8 months but not for the 
other months. So we don’t find that January is an exceptional month in which losers significantly outperform the 
winners as documented in the literature by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993; 2001). 
 
Table 5: Results from Regression on Carhart Four Factor Model 
DJI100 stands for Dow Jones islamic 100 titans index, W1DOW represents Dow jones Global index. We test the following 
equation using ARCH (2) framework: ttuthtsftmtftt εUMDβHMLβSMBβRRβαRR ++++)-(+=)-(  
*, **, *** indicate significance respectively at the 10%, 5%, and 1% confidence levels. P values are given in parentheses: 
α  β  sβ  hβ  uβ  
-0.0134*** 0.3049*** 0.1304 -0.0050 -0.00828 
(0.0032) (0.0000) (0.2294) (0.9404) (0.1384) 
 
Table 5 shows the estimation in ARCH (2) framework of the Carhart four-factor model. The alpha value is 
negative and significant at 1% level, which means that the selection of assets with Islamic screening produces a 
negative performance due to the lack of diversification, which is consistent with the portfolio theory (Barnett & 
Salomon, 2006). Also, the coefficient of market risk premium is positive and significant which means that historical 
higher rate is associated with risky investments. 
 
We extend the analysis to study the persistence of the performance over the economic cycle, the goal is to 
see whether the behaviour of the firms of our sample changes in recession or expansion periods according to the 
NBER business cycle reference dates. 
 
Table 6: Results from Regression on Carhart Four-Factor Model Including Dummy Variable for Recession 
DJI100 stands for Dow Jones Islamic 100 titans index, W1DOW represents Dow Jones Global index. We test the following 
equation by allowing for ARCH (2) framework: 
tuthtsftmtftt UMDβHMLβSMBβRRβαRR +++)-(+=)-( tttutthttsftmttt εUMDDβHMLDβSMBDβRRDβDα +++'+)-('+'+
'''''
 
*, **, *** indicate significance respectively at the 10%, 5% and 1% confidence levels. P values are given in parentheses: 
α  β  sβ  hβ  uβ  'α  'β  'sβ  'hβ  'uβ  
-0.009 
(0.103) 
0.391*** 
(0.000) 
0.074 
(0.552) 
0.003 
(0.976) 
0.071 
(0.240) 
-0.022* 
(0.083) 
-0.245* 
(0.096) 
0.428 
(0.925) 
-0.065 
(0.715) 
-0.119 
(0.514) 
 
Table 6 shows that by adding the dummy variable to take into account the recession, only β  remains 
significant and increase in absolute magnitude against the benchmark. The additional information comes from 'α  
and 'β  which are negative and significant at 10% level, it means that the market premium is higher in the recession 
period than in expansion period. These findings can be explained by the exclusion of some industries considered to 
be recession-proof, for example during bad times people don’t reduce their consumption of alcoholic products, 
tobacco, gambling, etc. which remains in line with the findings of researches on sin stocks. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
Using the four-factor model, we studied the performance of an Islamic index by constructing various 
portfolios from the component firms. Islamic indices as well as all ethical indices are a subset of well diversified 
indices, the screening process reduces the number of included firms and causes a lack of diversification. 
 
In order to learn more about the performance persistence of ethical investments we construct portfolios 
based on the size (SMB), the book-to-market (HML), and the momentum (UMD) as documented in the finance 
literature. Then we examined the mean and the risk of constructed portfolios from 1999 to 2011. Our results show 
very low correlations between factors as well as positive performance for momentum strategy over the period. But 
we found no seasonality in momentum profits. 
 
Then, we used the four-factor regression analysis; we found no evidence of persistence across the 
performance of the Islamic index. Thus, in comparison with the benchmark, this index produces an average negative 
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alpha from 1999 to 2011 including the recession period which means that ethical screening criteria could not 
produce a positive performance, after neutralizing the size and the style differences. However, it seems that this 
under-performance does not influence ethical investors which seem to be more concerned with ethical issues than 
financial performance, in many cases they accept to pay a price for their ethics. 
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Appendix 1: International Islamic Indices 
Index Launch Provider Characteristics 
Dow Jones 
Islamic Market 
Index (DJIMI) 
February 1999 Dow Jones 
 Geographical coverage: 66 countries 
 Sectorial allocation 
 Shariah board: 5 independent Scholars 
 trimestrial revision 
Global Islamic 
Index Series 
(GIIS) 
October 1999 FTSE Group 
Include 3 index series: 
 FTSE SGX Shariah Index Series  (with Singapore Exchange) 
 FTSE DIFX Shariah Index Series (with Nasdaq Dubai) 
 FTSE Bursa Malaysia Index Series (with Bursa Malaysia) 
MSCI Global 
Islamic Indices 
March 2007 MSCI 
 Geographical coverage: 70 countries 
 Sectorial allocation 
 Shariah board: Dar al Istithmar (5 scholars) 
 trimestrial revision 
S&P Shariah 
Index Series  
December 2006 
Standard and 
Poor’s 
 Geographical coverage: 70 countries 
 Sectorial allocation 
 Shariah board: Rating Intelligence Partners 
 trimestrial revision 
Stoxx Europe 
Islamic indices  
February 2011 Stoxx 
 Geographical coverage: Europe and Euro Zone 
 Sectorial allocation 
 Shariah board: 3 independent Scholars 
 trimestrial revision 
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Appendix 2: Quantitative and Qualitative Screens to Filter out Dow Jones Islamic Market Index 
 
According to DJIMI standards, if the company has lines of business in any one of the following sectors 
defined by the Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB), it is considered inappropriate for Islamic investment 
purposes and is excluded from the index: 
 
 2717 Defence 
 3535 Distillers and Vintners 
 3577 Food Products 
 3745 Recreational Products 
 3785 Tobacco 
 5337 Food Retailers & 
Wholesalers 
 5553 Broadcasting and 
Entertainment 
 5555 Media Agencies 
 5752 Gambling 
 5753 Hotels 
 5755 Recreational Services 
 5757 Restaurants and Bars 
 8355 Banks 
 8532 Full Line Insurance 
 8534 Insurance Brokers 
 8536 Property and Casualty 
Insurance 
 8733 Real Estate Holding and 
Development 
 8773 Consumer Finance 
 8775 Specialty Finance 
 8777 Investment Services 
 8779 Mortgage Finance 
 
The screens are designed to exclude companies with financial ratios incompatible with Shariah investment 
guidelines. Thus, to be included in Dow Jones Islamic Market Index, all of the following should be less than 33%: 
 
 Total debt divided by trailing 24-month average market capitalization 
 The sum of a company’s cash and interest-bearing securities divided by trailing 24 month average market 
capitalization 
 Accounts receivables divided by trailing 24-month average market capitalization. 
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